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Normative and Nowhere to Go
Pierre Schlag*
There is nothing quite like the exhilarating experience that comes from
reading a provocative new piece of legal thought. Of course, at some point
this exhilaration will give way to ennui as the new piece of legal thought
unravels--ultimately to be classified as yet another possibly clever, perhaps
thoughtful, but nonetheless utterly failed contribution. One characteristic
feature of our own postmodern condition is the breakneck speed with which
the second experience succeeds the first. From exhilaration to failure, the
distance has been reduced to a couple of sentences.
Take the 1980s, for instance. Last I remember, it was 1979 and I was
beginning my career. I had these incredible utopian visions and these abso-
lutely uncontrollable yearnings to prescribe these normative visions to large
numbers of strangers. I tried to find suitable employment where I could
indulge these uncontrollable prescriptive impulses. So I became a cabbie in
New York City.1 Sometime during my third week on the job, one of my
fares told me that I'd never make the grade. Oh sure, he said, I was norma-
tive enough-downright utopian. But I had no political sense. My timing
was off, way off-not just by a couple of street lights, but by entire centuries.
He called me a "liberal humanist." I didn't know what this meant, but his
unmistakably derisive tone indicated that it was not something I was sup-
posed to like. So I quit-a failed cabbie.
And I became a legal academic instead.2 The possibilities for normative
* @ 1990 by Pierre Schlag. Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., UCLA School of
Law; B.A., Yale College. For comments, suggestions, and criticisms of this essay, I am grateful to
Jean Braucher, David Carlson, David Clark, Richard Delgado, David Eason, Deborah Maranville,
Bob Nagel, Steve Smith, and Steve Winter.
This essay is part of a larger enterprise--an attempt to understand the character and status of
contemporary normative legal thought. For other installments, see Pierre Schlag, Normativity and
the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. - (forthcoming 1991) (tracing the role and effects of
normative legal thought); Pierre Schlag, 'Le Hors de Texte, Clest Moi'--The Politics of Form and
the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOzo L. 1Ev. - (1990) (forthcoming) [hereinafter
Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte'l (demonstrating the ways in which the unquestioned and unexamined
aesthetic of contemporary legal thought coopts and defuses critical approaches such as deconstruc-
tion); Pierre Schlag, Legal Nihilism (demonstrating the ways in which contemporary normative legal
thought produces nihilism).
1. [Editor's Note: The Stanford Law Review has been unable to confirm the author's assertion
here. The evidence we have suggests that in 1979, the author was employed as an associate with a
large law firm in Washington, D.C. The author assures us, however, that the taxi driver/associate
distinction is vastly overstated, and in some senses, is actually much more tenuous than might first
appear. Cf. ELISABETH HYDE, HER NATIVE CoLORs 20-37 (1986) (depicting the associate as
human resource and information dissemination vehicle).]
2. For further elaboration, see R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1957).
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speculation seemed endless. I would write for the Warren Court... forever
... and no one would dare call me on it.3 Yes. And I would write the great
American utopian chain novel--each chapter more morally appealing than
the last.4 I would argue that in the future, we should all be really moral...
for even more than fifteen minutes.
Things were going really well and really morally. I was a real norma-
tivo--deep into norm-selection and nonn-justification. And then this guy-
the same guy who interrupted my promising career as a taxi driver-showed
up again, out of nowhere. Just like that, right in the middle of my text. No
transition at all.5 In fact, here he is. And he's saying that he's a
postmodernist now and that he wants to continue my text. Imagine my em-
barrassment. I tell him that this is an outrageous provocation, a scandal.
He agrees. I tell him in no uncertain terms that I am the author and that I
won't stand for this behavior, and that neither will the reader, nor the
AALS. He says that I sound like "the interpretive turn" and that the inter-
pretive turn has already turned into footnotes.6
3. Many "progressive" legal academics are still writing articles for the Warren Court and those
"liberal" federal courts. This raises a very difficult question about the current composition of the
Supreme Court and other federal courts.
I think it is important that we not jump to conclusions too hastily. It does seem, however, at
least as a preliminary hypothesis, that some evidence suggests that the Warren Court is no longer
sitting. Moreover, it appears that there may have been somewhat of a change in the composition of
the federal courts in what might be called a right wing direction. If this were true-and I advance
this claim only hypothetically-then it could be argued that addressing the federal courts to achieve
"liberal" or "progressive" ends might no longer be as effective as it once was. But clearly, it's too
soon to jump to such conclusions. Contra Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future of
Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REv. 189 (1988) (reckless young upstarts claim Warren
court no longer sitting, that federal courts are dominated by right wing, and that liberal legal schol-
ars should address their scholarship to other addressees); Steven Winter, Indeterminacy and Incom-
mensurability in Constitutional Law, - CALIF. L. REv. - (1990) (forthcoming) (brazen young
provocateur actually argues that federal courts may well no longer be totally receptive to "progres-
sive" scholarship).
4. See ambivalently RONALD DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
5. Well, actually that's not entirely true: He did drop a footnote to FRANz KAFKA, THE
METAMORPHOSIS (1935) (Gregor Samsa wakes up one morning embarrassed to discover that his
ontological condition no longer conforms to his own epistemic self-image).
6. And so here I was all of a sudden-reduced to a supporting role. This was my text-and
somehow I had landed in the footnote. How awful. This was worse than anything Gregor Sansa
ever had to put up with. See note 5 supra. My normative text was totally out of control. I was
outraged. I told the postmodernist, "You can't just walk into other people's text like this. This is an
outrageous provocation." He said, "You've already said that. You repeat your self a lot." For
elaboration see text accompanying notes 20-26 infra.
I pleaded, "But you can't just simply walk into other people's text like this and take over." And
he said, "Yes I can. What's more, all your interpretive protests can be relegated to a footnote.
Consider it done."
Of course, as you can understand, it didn't suit me to be here at all. "But, this is my text," I
protested. "I don't want to be in the footnotes." I tried to think of the sorts of arguments that I
could make. I had the clear sense that this was my property and that it would be inappropriate for
the postmodernist to take it away from me. I made the argument that this invasion of my text was
an assault not just on property, but also on its underlying values-the autonomy and dignity of the
individual. I argued that if this sort of thing became public and widespread, authors would be
unlikely to invest much effort in writing.
Finally, I became angry and stated the fundamental predicate assumption for all these argu-
ments flat out: "I am the author, and it was not my intention to let you in. Now, move us back to
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So I tell him that if he's a postmodernist, he couldn't possibly have any-
thing to contribute to morality or ethics or politics, and that therefore he
doesn't belong in my text.7 "Not at all," he said. "Postmodernism is already
in this text. Postmodernism is here to do the charts on the normative arti-
cles of the eighties." "The charts?" I said. "What do you think this is? Top
40 radio? You can't do that. Normative articles are not the top ten, you
know."
the text right now." The postmodernist chuckled and said, "Bad move, dude-you've just made
your intention iterable."
And I said, "So?" And he said that because intention was iterable, it was always already medi-
ated by the text (see virtually anything that Jacques Derrida has written) and/or by interpretive
communities or practices (see virtually anything, not about Milton, that Stanley Fish has written).
Hence, the role (if any) of author's intention would always already be adjudicated (if at all) within
our interpretive practices or our texts. He said that the canonical legitimacy of author's intention as
a theory of meaning would invariably find itself nested where it really did not want to be: In the very
non-canonical contingent character of the text or of the interpretive practices of the community.
The postmodernist noted that this would be a somewhat inhospitable place for any self-respecting
transcendental signified such as author's intent.
This was too much. Not only had this stranger appeared uninvited in my text, but I had this
uncanny suspicion he was about to dismiss me as the author. This was unacceptable. I would report
the incident to the AALS committee on academic freedom. I would sue. I would .... But the more
I wrote, the worse things became.
And he didn't miss the chance to point it out. Soon it became apparent that the author/reader
distinction would go the way of all worldly things, and me along with it. And that's precisely what
happened. The postmodernist taunted, "I suppose you still think you're an author, don't you?"
And I said, "Yes." He said, "Not you. I don't mean you. I'm not talking to you." "Oh," I said,
and then I realized much to my horror, gentle reader, that it was you he was addressing in such
disrespectful tones. And so I told him in no uncertain terms that he could not treat the reader-you,
dear gentle reader-in this outrageously disrespectful manner. I said, "The reader won't stand for
it."
And it was precisely at this point that the postmodernist chose to inform me that I was no
longer the author. He told me, much as I had feared, that I was more of a reader than an author-
that in fact, I was responding to the claims, the arguments, the discourse of postmodernism. "Look
at your last five sentences," he said. "Each of them is a response to the postmodern text.
Postmodernism is writing your text. And you are reading it furiously-hanging on to determine
what it will say next."
I made a last-ditch effort. I pointed out that if this outrageous departure from accepted legal
form continued, this text would never get published-and neither of us would be heard from. I
suggested that the text would lose some of its cadence, some of its aesthetic appeal, its coherence. I
cited Dworkin. (R. DwoRIN, supra note 4). I said I was the author and that postmodernism
wouldn't fit with what I had already written. He said that postmodernism was already in the text
and he pointed to my first paragraph. He said that I had not written that paragraph-that
postmodemism had. He said this was a postmodem text as much as it was mine-that, by this
point, authorship was utterly undecidable.
7. But see Schlag, 'ELe Hors de Texte." supra note * (on the politics of deconstruction). Many
commentators see postmodernism as lacking any particular politics. In fact, however, they are un-
able to recognize or identify the politics of postmodernism because they try to locate postmodernism
within the orthodox matrices of a very traditional conception of politics-a conception that accepts
at face value the traditional characterizations of right and left, a conception that implicitly and
automatically equates politics with making value choices. See eg., Jack Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal,
and the Politics of Deconstruction, - CARDozo L. REv.- (1990) (forthcoming). Within the matri-
ces of this traditional-indeed fundamentalist--conception of politics, it is easy to miss the politics
of postmodernism precisely because the politics of postmodernism are to decenter and displace this




# 10 HAVE A NICE (REALLY ELEGANT AND TOTALLY ABSTRACT) DAY
This type of normative legal thought, a holdover from the seventies, is
still very popular today. Typically, it takes some truly wonderful normative
value, like justice or liberty or equality or whatever, and then tries its
damnedest to give the abstract value a content that is as determinate and
concrete, and yet as encompassing, as possible. While not necessarily deduc-
tive in structure, this sort of thought typically suffers from the same problem
found in deductive legal thought. That problem is that in the movement
from the abstract to the concrete, the mediations between the two are either
not to be found, or they are found to be utterly unconvincing.
For those who like abstract value talk but don't want to traffic in the
concrete at all, there is another option, particularly useful for those scholars
who have figured out what should be done--e.g., we should all be really nice
to each other-but haven't the foggiest idea of how we should go about do-
ing it. The thing to do is to name what should be done in a way that makes
it look like a normative value-something that has life, force, and direction.
This is not so much reification as it is animism, but it really does work, too."
The next step is to argue very pontifically, with whatever drama liberal hu-
manism can still muster, that we should all do or be more like the normative
value. This kind of talk is often vacuous, but given sufficient self-righteous-
ness, pomposity, pseudo-sophistication, or status in institutional affiliation,
no one will notice. What's more, this sort of thought doubles really well as a
graduation speech.
Recently, many legal academics have come to recognize that this ab-
stract value talk actually excludes many members of the audience.9 In the
formal structure of its discourse, abstract value talk pre-scripts the answers
to many politically controversial questions. This point has been made force-
fully by feminist and critical legal studies scholars. 10 I think this negative
point is right and important. Unfortunately, it has yielded a positive pro-
gram that appears to, but in fact does not, follow (logically or politically, or
strategically) from the negative one. To say that abstract value talk is illegit-
imately exclusionary in no way suggests that...
#9 WE SHOULD TALK AND TALK AND TALK ABOUT TALK AND JUST
KEEP ON TALKING
Given the rather obvious bankruptcy of abstract value talk, the talk-talk
genre has become very popular recently. My guess is that this strategy was
created by some legal academics circling over Chicago's O'Hare Airport
8. A lot of work.
9. In fact, it has a real tendency to turn them into members of the audience (as opposed to
participants) in the first place.
10. See, eag., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAM.
L. REv. 1151 (1985).
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waiting to land. The main point of this strategy is to make normative legal
thought really small-so small that it will contribute next to nothing to legal
discourse. For example, notice that this strategy does not even talk in a new
way.1 This strategy simply argues in all the old ways that we should talk
the new talk. It is the jurisprudence of the holding pattern. Variations on




more like civic republicans,
more like narrative,
more like normal (doctrinal) science,
more like pragmatists,
or in that hopeful humanist way until we figure out what the hell we're
doing up here 30,000 feet from earth arguing about how we should land.
One interesting thing about the talk-talk genre is that its basic question,
"How should we talk?" assumes that how we talk is somehow our choice-
that we (you and I) are already intellectually and politically enabled to de-
cide, one way or another. Such an assumption, of course, is routine and
uncontroversial within the dominant tradition of contemporary normative
legal thought-namely, the epiphenomenological tradition.
And yet one begins to suspect that epiphenomenology cannot be the
whole story. One begins to suspect that the answers given to the question
"How should we talk?" may well have been already scripted by as-yet unar-
ticulated answers to questions such as: On what or whose terms are we
already talking? What is making us talk? And who or what gets to stop the
talk? One might begin to have these suspicions when one recognizes that
even though the prescriptions for how we should talk all seem to vary con-
siderably (and never seem to get adopted),' 2 the process, the form, the rheto-
ric of the argumentation that supports these prescriptions stays pretty much
the same.
Some people, of course, get impatient with all this talk. It's too process-
oriented. It seems too far removed from what they see as the rightful focus
of our normative attention on "substance." For those who are unhappy with
the ultra-mediated character of the talk-talk genre, there is the self-an-
nouncedly more "substantive" formula:
#8 X-GOOD/Y-BAD
This is an extremely old and venerable genre-but still very current to-
day. It has classic conservative lines and is always in good taste. Examples
of this sort of thought include the following:
11. That might actually contribute something to the dialogue (or whatever it is that is going
on).
12. Except maybe in seriously degraded form.
November 1990]
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Rule of Law-good/Legal Realism-bad
Civic Republicanism-good/Liberalism-bad
Feminist Jurisprudence-good/Critical Legal Studies-bad
Not all normative legal thought is as simple or as transparent in its norma-
tive structure as the above genres suggest-though, of course, .... Some-
times, however, the normative structure of the thought is difficult to discern
because it is better dissimulated. For instance, it just might be the case that
#7 TH ZErrGEIST is GOING MY WAY
13
In this sort of thought, the author and the arguments subtly recede into
the background of the text. This thought strives to efface the author. In-
stead, an impressive compendium of trends, thoughts and authorities drawn
from (virtually) every discipline just happen to coincide (in the footnotes, of
course) to support a text which, in turn, that just happens to support the
normative program of the author's choice. The great advantage of this form
of normative thought is that the inexorable force of the entire culture ap-
pears to be supporting the author's favorite normative program. Not only is
the culture behind the author every step of the way, footnote to footnote, but
fortuity is on the author's side as well. Invariably, it will appear that the
culture has already moved substantially down the author's preferred norma-
tive path. In this best of all possible worlds, what ought to be is already
becoming so-every day in every way.
One signal difficulty with this sort of all-points meteorological report is
that the zeitgeist generally doesn't fit very well in footnotes. Maybe it's be-
cause the text/footnote distinction is so relentlessly Cartesian in character
and thus inhospitable to the Germanic dynamism of the zeitgeist. Or maybe
it's because the zeitgeist just doesn't believe in fine print. These are both
possibilities. My sense, however, is that the real problem is that the zeitgeist
is simply un-American: It simply is not willing to think of itself as some
supporting accessory to our individual projects.
14
In any case, it invariably turns out that in this kind of thought, signifi-
cant parts of the zeitgeist seem to be left out. This sometimes creates
problems for the author, but it is seldom a problem for the zeitgeist. On the
contrary: The excluded portions of the zeitgeist are virtually guaranteed to
feature in another work, typically one that takes a diametrically opposed
normative stance.
One of the striking things about these meteorological zeitgeist reports is
that they rarely seem to pick up on postmodern currents. Striking, but not
13. Sinatra does Hegel. (His way, of course.)
14. "We believe in the dignity, indeed the sacredness, of the individual. Anything [like the
zeitgeist, for instance] that would violate our right to think for ourselves, judge for ourselves, make
our own decisions, live our lives as we see fit, is not only morally wrong, it is sacrilegious." RicH-
ARD N. BELLAH, RICHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SVIDLER & STEVEN M. Tip-
TON, HABITS OF THE HEART 142 (1985).
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exactly surprising: Normative legal thought is structured not to recognize
these kinds of currents. Indeed, normative legal thought is always already
launched in the sort of interpretive enterprise guaranteed to read
postmodernism right off the charts. 15 This, of course, brings us to yet an-
other venerable form of normative legal thought, which is none other than
#6 POSTMODERNIST SHADOW-BOXING
This form of legal thought is squarely within the liberal humanist tradi-
tion. It offers maximum opportunities for righteous self-declamation about
the moral wonderfulness of normative legal thought, as well as the moral
wonderfulness of its author. Likewise, it offers tremendous possibilities to
"fight the good fight" by warning of the utter amorality and irreducible evil
of any intellectual current critical of liberal humanism-including, quite
topically, postmodernism.
Postmodernism questions the integrity, the coherence, and the actual
identity of the humanist individual self-the knowing sort of self produced
by Enlightenment epistemology and featured so often as the dominant self-
image of the professional academic. 16 For postmodernism, this humanist
individual subject is a construction of texts, discourses, and institutions. The
promise that this particular human agent would realize freedom, autonomy,
etc., has turned out to be just so much Kant. And the humanist individual
subject has turned out to be Dan Quayle. 17 Indeed, for postmodemism, the
humanist individual subject has now become one of the main disciplinary
vehicles by which bureaucratic institutions stylize, construct, organize and
police their clientele. To inhabit the rhetorical space of the humanist indi-
vidual subject, is to be-like Dan Quayle-subject to a variety of bureau-
cratic monitoring practices that, quite paradoxically but very effectively,
transform the human being into the intellectual and social equivalent of a
doe staring into the headlights. Liberal humanist talk of freedom, auton-
omy, choice, and so on seems, at least in this context, greatly out of place.
For postmodernism, the production of intellectual work that partici-
pates-in theory or in practice-in the ideology of this individualist human-
ist self is at best normatively ambivalent. On the one hand, such work may
help achieve some desirable concrete end; on the other, the very performance
of such work reproduces precisely the form of thought, the very rhetoric by
which bureaucratic institutional practices re-present, organize, and
reproduce their own operations, their own performances as the choices of
15. See Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces" A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 Tax. L. REv. 1195
(1989).
16. For an elaboration of the character of this self and its rhetorical supports, see Schiag, ' Le
Hors de Texte " supra note *.
17. Dan Quayle is wonderfully emblematic of what is at once the awesome success and the
utter defeat of the Enlightenment-the point at which the individual, autonomous subject and his
rationality are so institutionally and socially ingrained that it has become virtually impossible for
this subject to be or to think in any other way.
November 1990]
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autonomous, rational agents.' 8 Accordingly, the participation of normative
legal thought in this liberal humanist ideology has become, in terms of the
very best values liberal humanism has to offer, morally ambivalen if not
immoral.'9
18. As it is doing here, postmodernism often treads very close to issuing some normative judg-
ments of its own. Indeed, perhaps it very often does. One of the tricks of some postmodernist
writers is to avoid explicitly making normative statements, knowing full well that the reader will
read the language in a normative way and that, in a pinch, the reader can always be blamed for
having read those "normative" judgments into the text. This approach strikes me as missing impor-
tant aspects of the postmodern condition.
The normatively charged vocabulary and grammar are pervasive and cannot be "intentionally"
avoided by something so decentered as a lone author. Moreover, the problem for postmodemists
(not to mention everybody else) is that while the normative vocabulary and grammar are no longer
an acceptable currency for intellectuals to use in advancing claims for human beings, there is no
other vocabulary, no other grammar, as of yet.
That does not mean that the normative vocabulary and grammar of liberal humanism wins by
default. On the contrary, that vocabulary, that grammar, is, as a normative matter (not as a social
matter), increasingly irrelevant to our situation. See text accompanying notes 27-65 infra.
To describe things as I am doing now invites a series of predicaments and paradoxes. To a large
extent, postmodernism recognizes and embraces these predicaments and paradoxes. See eg., Jac-
ques Derrida, Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in WRITING AND
DIFFERENcE 280 (A. Bass trans. 1978) ("There is no sense in doing without the concepts of meta-
physics in order to shake metaphysics.... [W]e can pronounce not a single destructive proposition
which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely
what it seeks to contest.") Postmodernists are quite unlikely to take the demonstration of a paradox
in their text as in and of itself evidence of weakness or flaw. Quite the contrary. One significant
advance that postmodernists have made is to recognize that thought and the thinker (you and I)
themselves operate within what economists call a second best world (see note 2 supra) and that the
first best world of traditional legal, social, and philosophical thought which routinely insists on naive
rationalist conceptions of coherence, consistency, elegance, etc., is largely the product of disciplinary
hubris and the inertia of academic bureaucracy.
Indeed, what is at stake in the struggle between postmodern and more traditional thinking is
very much a dispute over the criteriology of thought and knowledge. For a description of (not an
argument about) the character and criteriology of postmodern thought, see JEAN-FRAN90S LY-
OTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (G. Bennington & B. Mas-
sumi trans. 1984). For an argument using traditional legal reasoning to demonstrate the
systemically paradoxical character of contemporary legal thought, see Pierre Schlag, Cannibal
Moves An Essay on The Metamophoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REv. 929 (1988) [here-
inafter Schlag, Cannibal Moves].
My effort here, as elsewhere, is to try to displace, decenter, and weaken this system of normative
legal thought. That does not mean that I should, will, or am even capable of demonstrably standing
outside of this system. I could, of course, draw a distinction so that I could claim to stand outside of
this system, and thus claim to avoid paradox, but this rationalist artifice would be unhelpful. It
would beg the exceedingly interesting question of where the boundaries (if any) of this system of
normative legal thought are located and whether this system can even be adequately conceptualized
as having a determinate or localizable inside and outside. These are complex and interesting ques-
tions, and I am not about to close them off prematurely simply because the rationalist aesthetic of
traditional legal thought abhors paradox. Besides, in some senses, such a conceptualist closure
wouldn't work. For further thoughts, see Schiag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, supra note o;
see also note 19 infra.
19. Postmodernism can identify these bureaucratic practices in straightfoward normative
terms as coercive-extinguishing human freedom, choice, autonomy, etc. But although such a tradi-
tional normative condemnation might (in a paradoxical way) seem helpful politically, it would none-
theless miss something of what is going on.
What such a straightfoward normative condemnation misses is that it is not so much a question
of our freedom, autonomy, or choice being taken away. Rather, it is that bureaucratic, institutional,
and linguistic practices construct us as beings for whom the liberal humanist understandings of
freedom, choice, autonomy are not structural possibilities in the firstplace. The ironic kicker here is
that while normative legal thought is heading straight for normative bankruptcy (see text accompa-
[Vol. 43:167
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Normative legal thought as a local legal variant of liberal humanism has
correctly understood that it, too, is targeted by postmodernism. And so very
courageously, normative legal thought has met the challenge head on. The
very first move of normative legal thought has been to assume automatically,
as a matter of its own form, that it is authored by and addressed to an auton-
omous, coherent, integrated, rational, originary self, receptive to moral argu-
ment through a medium of language that is itself weightless and neutral. In
other words, no sooner does normative legal thought begin to address
postmodernism than it rhetorically assumes into existence precisely the sort
of individual humanist subject-the very sort of author and reader-that
postmodernism calls into question. 20
This, of course, is a really terrific move.21 Indeed, once normative legal
thought rhetorically populates the world with these individual humanist sub-
jects, the rest of the rejoinder to postmodernism is child's play. If the world
is always already populated by such autonomous rational, morally compe-
tent individual subjects, then postmodernism is a lunatic and immoral effort
to silence our last best hope for doing good in the world. The conclusion
then follows effortlessly: If postmodernists want to contribute something to
law or legal thought, they should first develop a normative vision.22 Here
liberal humanism courageously converges with the Thumper school of juris-
prudence: "If you can't say anything nice, don't say anything at all." 23
nying notes 45-65 infra), it remains rhetorically and socially operative. Indeed, the bureaucratic and
institutional practices we inhabit, in the legal academy and elsewhere, re-present, organize, and
reproduce their own operations, their own performances, within the normative vocabulary and
grammar.
20. And the important thing to note is that even as normative legal thought is willing to enter-
tain as a substantive proposition that the notion of an individual humanist subject is an overstate-
ment or a fiction, it will do so only within its own rhetorical form-the very form that tacitly
establishes the author and reader as already-constituted autonomous individual subjects. See Schlag,
"Le Hors de Texte " supra note *.
One of the things that makes normative legal thought's attempts to deal with postmodernism
typically uninteresting is that the discussion inevitably comes down to a couple of autonomous indi-
vidual subjects sitting around talking about whether they exist or not. Not surprisingly, the conclu-
sion is utterly predictable. It's kind of like asking God to decide whether Nietzsche is right.
21. And, of course, from the normative perspective, this move seems totally legitimate. It
seems totally legitimate because, normative legal thought systematically eclipses the rhetorical con-
tributions that its own form makes to its own end products. And thus, not suprisingly, normative
legal thought does not even have a glimmer of the way in which it rigs the game. See id
22. It is amazing how quickly the champions of normative legal thought--experts in the logic
of responsibility and obligation-ascribe blame to postmodernists for an ostensible failure to develop
apostmodern normative vision. This is a bizarrely pre-Coasean, a strangely unidirectional, allocation
of blame. Indeed, one wonders why the normative thinkers do not blame themselves for having
failed to develop a normative postmodern vision?
My sense is that if normative legal thinkers were not so busy still putting the finishing touches
on normative theories grounded in eighteenth century understandings of epistemology, the self,
human agency, human reason, etc., perhaps they might actually have time to think about how to
construct a kind of normative thought appropriate to our ultra-bureaucratized postmodera condi-
tion.
But no. Not at all. On the contrary.
23. Bambi (Walt Disney Studios 1942). See generally id.
The Thumper school of jurisprudence, like virtually all other jurisprudential schools, has taken
a rather decisive instrumentalist turn lately. Accordingly, in the legal academy, Thumper's tran-
scendental value in niceness has been transformed into the more instrumentalist value in being "con-
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If all this sounds like a series of winning moves, that's because in a
sense-in a very solipsistic sense-it is. This is one of the beauties of disci-
plinary solipsism: If you never allow "the other" (i.e., here, postmodernism)
the possibility of changing your consciousness, your thought patterns, your
cognitive or affective disposition, your text, etc., then you will always al-
ready be able to defeat "the other."24 You will always already win. Solip-
sism really does work.., it does a lot of work.25 It has worked really well
for a really long time in legal thought.26 But notice three things about solip-
structive." Thus, it is widely held among legal thinkers that one should not merely criticize or
destroy, but try to be constructive as well.
I find this sort of position perplexing-even on modernist terms. Consider a graphic example:
If you take someone's neurosis away, are you being destructive (of that person's way of doing things)
or are you being constructive (of a new organically healthy person)? If you were being destructive
when you took away the person's neurosis, are you then obliged to do something more afterwards-
something constructive? What would this additional constructive moment look like, and how would
it help? Indeed, how often does a "cured" patient terminate therapy with the statement, "Yes, I
understand I'm fine now. There's just one more question, doctor: What should I do?"
But consider this instead: Just what is it that the academic routine is telling us when it advises
legal thinkers to prescribe solutions? What is this-law and pharmacy? Are latent Langdellian
science metaphors still channeling our thoughts? Should the AALS investigate? Should normative
legal thought be registered under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1982 &
Supp. 1987)?
24. See Pierre Schlag, Contradiction and Denial (Book Review), 87 MicH. L. REv. 1216
(1989). This is the structure of James Boyd White's main objection to Richard Posner's recent
exploration of law and literature. James Boyd White argues that in a very real sense Richard Posner
has not encountered the works of literature that he reports to have read:
One way to put what is troubling is to think of what is missing from [Posner's] book. As I,
at least, read through it I have no sense of the kind of life one associates with the reading of
literary texts: no sense of a mind responding and learning, no sense of puzzle and illumina-
tion, no sense of joy or pleasure in the reading itself, no sense indeed of the presence of
another mind with whom the author is engaged .... And there is something similar in the
way his own text assumes that it will be read: it has the structure of an argument sup-
ported by examples, not that of a mind reaching out to another mind. It all seems a kind of
display, a proof of something.,
James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature? (Book Review), 102 HARv. L. REV.
2014, 2014-15 (1989).
25. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform
Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REv. 207 (1989) (tracing the
disciplinary solipsism of legal thought to the convention-reinforcing character of research indexes
and classification systems).
26. Stanley Fish knows this. See generally STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATU-
RALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES
(1989). Stanley Fish keeps showing how legal (and other) academics are at once caught within the
rhetorical structures of their own professional expertise and at the same time quite oblivious to the
way in which these rhetorical structures constrain and enable their thought. He keeps showing this
over and over again.
But, in rhetorical conformity with Stanley Fish's point, (virtually) nobody gets "it." And since
they don't get "it," they all attack Stanley Fish from within the disciplinary structures of their own
professional expertise. Ironically, this serves only to confirm the very point Stanley Fish is making.
Indeed, you can even hear him at this very moment, saying, "Of course that's what they are doing.
What else could they do?" Id at 372-98.
And in a sense, Stanley Fish is right-right in a socially contingent sort of way. An incredibly
astute observer of academic practice, Stanley Fish has noticed that much of academic practice is
simply a series of exercises in disciplinary solipsism. So Stanley Fish quite cleverly lays out language
games in which the practitioners of the various disciplinary solipsisms are rhetorically prompted or
trapped, as the case may be, into performatively confirming their own disciplinary solipsism. See
undecidably Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. LJ.
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sism. First thing: The routine assumption of disciplinary solipsism that it is
in control of its own intellectual or rhetorical situation seems somewhat
overstated. Second thing: It gets to be rather boring to repeat the same old
moves. And boredom is not something to be ignored. It is not something to
be trivialized. Boredom is the structure's way of telling you something. It's
telling you, "Yoo hoo, over here-I'm the structure, and boy, do I have your
life down pat." Third thing: If you really think you are a self-directing,
autonomous, liberal humanist subject, you really do have to wonder why it is
you just always happen to "choose" to repeat the same old boring moves.
So much for the top ten of normative legal thought in the eighties. Now
you may have noticed that there are only five entries in the top ten. That is
because the rhetorical situation of normative legal thought is even more des-
perate than I had initially imagined. To be sure, one could add other entries
to the list, but then the redundancy quotient would rise intolerably and
things would become rather repetitive and boring.
But then again, that is precisely one of my points. And there is no point
in overdoing it-normative legal thought is overdoing it all by itself, getting
more repetitive all the time, asking "What should we do? What should the
law be? What do you propose?" over and over again.
In fact, even as you read and even as I write, normative legal thought is
busy urging us (you and me) to ask these very same questions of this very
essay at this very moment. "What should we do? What's the point?" asks
normative legal thought. "If normative legal thought isn't going anywhere,
what should we do instead?" "What do you propose?" "What's the solu-
tion?" These familiar questions are usually asked in searching, serious, som-
ber tones. There is no trace of irony in their articulation-no self-
consciousness at all. It is as if the intellectual legitimacy, the political im-
port, of the questions were themselves self-evident, beyond question.27 "Yes,
yes-but what should we do? How do these observations help?" Usually,
the questions are asked with such earnest, self-assured self-certainty that it is
as if the body of knowledge that enables the questions to be stated in the first
place were somehow outside the problem, outside the difficulty-already in-
tellectually whole, already politically competent to provide the answers.
28
37 (1987) [hereinafter Schlag, Fish v. Zapp] (demonstrating how Fish's "interpretive communities"
functions as a kind of black box in which academics project their favorite meaning structures).
For a brilliant critique of Stanley Fish's work that engages Fish on his own turf and thus largely
escapes this solipsism, see Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv.
639 (1990).
27. But soon the import of the questions will be put in question. See Symposium: The Critique
of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REv. - (forthcoming 1991).
28. It is precisely this disciplinary hubris that postmodernism is out to deflate. Postmodernism
is out to intensify the critical reflexivity that is already present in and marks the relative evolutionary
achievements of rationalist and modernist thought. Postmodernism is simply more serious in push-
ing the bounds of critical thought. And as these bounds are pushed, much of what previously ap-




"Right, right, but the question is, what should we do with all this?"
Now you'll notice that here the "What should we do?" is an interruption.
It is an interruption posing as an origin. It poses as an origin in that it takes
itself to be the original motivation for engaging in legal thought.29 And yet
here, the "What should we do?" interrupts the process of trying to under-
stand what enterprise we, as legal thinkers, are already engaged in. It inter-
rupts the process of attempting to reveal the character of our disciplines and
our practices as legal thinkers. "O.K., O.K., but how would such revelations
help us decide what we should do?"
You'll notice that here (as elsewhere) normative legal thought has a very
pressing and urgent tone. It wants to know right away what should be done.
Right away. And true to its name, normative legal thought wants to engage
right away in the enterprise of norm-selection. Normative legal thought
wants to decide as quickly as possible which norm (which doctrine, which
rule, which theory) should govern a particular activity.
Now as intellectually stiffling and politically narrow as the enterprise of
norm-selection may be,30 it still offers legal thinkers some residual possibility
of posing interesting philosophical, social, psychological, economic, or semi-
otic inquiries about law. Yet normative legal thought can't wait to shut
down these intellectual and political openings as well. It cannot wait to en-
velop these inquiries in its own highly stylized ethical-moral form of norm-
justification. Normative legal thought cannot wait to enlist epistemology,
semiotics, social theory or any other enterprise in its own ethical-moral argu-
ment structures about the right, the good, the useful, the efficient (or any of
their doctrinally crystallized derivatives). It cannot wait to reduce world
views, attitudes, demonstrations, provocations, and thought itself, to norms.
In short, it cannot wait to tell you (or somebody else) what to do.
In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you
what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might
actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you
were in a position to put the difference principle3' into effect, or to restruc-
29. And in one sense, the "What we should do?" does appear to be an originary motivation.
There is little doubt that many legal academics, like my cabbie (see text accompanying notes 1-6
supra) entered the legal academy motivated in significant part by a laudable interest in bettering the
law through normative prescriptions addressed to courts and other legal actors.
But before we call this motivation originary, we ought to recognize that this particular motiva-
tion is itself socially and rhetorically constructed-that it is itself a product of three years of law
school training and of the wider culture. We also ought to consider that the rubric of motivation
generally, its scope, reach, and depth, are themselves socially constructed. As Lenny Bruce put it,
"But I'm not original. The only way I could truly say I was original is if I created the English
language." THE ESSENTIAL LENNY BRUCE 102 (J. Cohen ed. 1967).
30. The urgency of normative legal thought masks the narrowness-both intellectual and
political-of the norm-selection enterprise. Indeed, to engage effectively-that is, successfully-in
norm-selection implies choosing a norm that will not require significant alteration of the audience's
belief system. Only those kinds of norms that already conform largely to the audience's belief system
are likely to meet with any sort of wide-scale approval. It is thus no surprise that the ready-made
conceptualization of the scholarly project as one of norm-selection is one that ends with the valida-
tion of the norm-selection and norm-justification process of the audience.
31. See generally JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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ture the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should
... ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges
should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Her-
cules surrogates?
Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such
worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own dis-
course. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and
resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly con-
sequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for
all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a
few law students-persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of
its wonderful normative advice into effect.
32
If there's no one in charge at the other end of the line, why then is nor-
mative legal thought in such a hurry to get its message across? 33 And why,
particularly, is it always in such a hurry to repeat the same old boring
moves? There is an edge to these questions. And the edge comes in part
from our implicit assumption that normative legal thought is a kind of
thought and that, as thought, it is in control of its own situation, its own
form, its own rhetoric.
But it isn't so. If normative legal thought keeps repeating itself, and if it
is incapable of understanding challenges to its own intellectual authority,
that is because it is not simply or even fundamentally a kind of thought.
Normative legal thought is in part a routine-our routine. It is the highly
repetitive, cognitively entrenched, institutionally sanctioned, and politically
enforced routine of the legal academy-a routine that silently produces our
thoughts and keeps our work channeled within the same old cognitive and
rhetorical matrices. 34 Like most routines, it has been so well internalized
32. The possibility that a significant number of judges might actually be reading significant
quantities of this academic literature is undemonstrated and unlikely. The possibility that judges
might actually be persuaded by this academic literature to adopt a position not their own is even
more undemonstrated and even more unlikely.
The only kind of normative legal thought that might actually be having some significant and
authentic normative efflect on judicial decisionmaking (and here again, it is difficult to know which
way the causal lines would run) is the work of the treatise writers. But, this treatise work cannot
really be seen as having much effect, since much of it is simply a reflection (an encyclopedic collec-
tion) of the modes of thought and norms already extant in the courts.
33. One answer is precisely that normative legal thought conceives its own linguistic situation
in just this unproblematic manner: "getting its message across." Normative legal thought estab-
lishes and sees itself as transmitting important "substance" through already existing, relatively unob-
structed channels of legal communication. This conception of language as an empty, neutral,
already extant conduit for thought is itself linguistically embedded in our metaphorical understand-
ing of language. See Michael J. Reddy, The Conduit Metaphor-A Case of Frame Conflict in Our
Language about Language, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 284 (A. Ortony ed. 1979). Unfortu-
nately, as Reddy demonstrates, this conception greatly overestimates the possibility of successful
communication and greatly underestimates the need for active intervention on the part of the partici-
pants in constructing communication. Id.
34. For a provocative discussion of the importance of routine in social interaction, see P.C.
Wohlmuth & LJ. Goldberg, The Significance of Routine in the Operation of Human Regulatory
Systems." Reexamining the Relationship of ADR to Law, in DisPuTE PROCESSING: LEGAL AND




that we repeat it automatically, without thinking. And like most routines, it
remains unseen and unobserved-which is why it is so powerful. 35 It is an
aspect-a significant aspect-of the unnoticed and untroubled overarching
epistemic economy within which (virtually) all contemporary legal thought
is produced. In terms somewhat misleading but more familiar to legal think-
ers, normative legal thought is the latest incarnation of the Langdellian leg-
acy, the latest variation on formalism36-normative formalism.
37
Normative legal thought, of course, does not consider itself a formalist
enterprise.35 And from the normative perspective, indeed, it is not. From
the normative perspective, the formalist character of normative thought is
not visible.39 The very form within which normative legal thought re-
35. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 49-50 (1983)
("[C]ategorical schemes have a power that is greatest when it is least noticed. They channel the
attention of those who use them, structuring experience into the focal and the peripheral. In so
doing, they influence judgment much as the agenda for a meeting influences the results of its
deliberations.").
36. For a critique of the formalist tendencies of some kinds of normative legal thought, see
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book Review), 76 CALiF. L. REv. 465 (1988).
37. For an elaboration of the formalist character of normative legal thought, see Schlag,
Normativity and the Politics of Form, supra note *.
38. Quite the contrary. One important conventional understanding within the legal academy
treats normative legal thought as being opposed to formalism. This conventional understanding of
normative legal thought is much narrower than my use of the expression in this essay. In conven-
tional terms, normative legal thought has been associated with a group of left-liberal legal scholars
who favor open-ended forms of value talk and argument in the courts and in the academy. Their
theory of legal legitimacy and legal meaning depends heavily and very rapidly on the explicit moral
justification of legal decisions. The normative legal thinkers understand themselves to be opposed to
a second group consisting of center-right scholars: the doctrinalists. The doctrinalists are commit-
ted to more technical forms of legal argument that they claim to be distinctly legal-different and
separable from the general cultural run of moral or political argument. Their theory of legitimacy
and legal meaning inclines heavily and very rapidly toward legal positivism. The two sides of this
conventional dispute are aptly personnifled by Ronald Dworkin and Robert Bork, respectively.
Compare R. DWORmN, supra note 4, with Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and the First Amend-
ment, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
This conventional dispute has been extremely influential in fashioning the legal academy's un-
derstanding of normative legal thought. Indeed, throughout the legal academy, normative legal
thought is often conventionally associated with the left-liberal plea for open-ended value talk and is
typically opposed to technical doctrinalism. Because the left-liberals have charged the doctrinalists
with formalism and authoritarianism (see, e.g., Robin West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitu-
tional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 531 (1988)), the prevalent understanding in the legal academy is
that normative legal thought stands in opposition to formalism.
This essay tries to get beyond this conventional understanding of the dispute. Both sides are
caught up within their own formalism and both sides are pervasively normative. The claim here is
that both old-style doctrinalism and normative thought can most helpfully be understood as two
related moments within the same practice of normative legal thought-two related moments that are
highly reminiscent of the classic rules vs. standards dispute. Indeed, one side emphasizes the need
for closure, certainty, and generality, while the other emphasizes the need for openness, flexibility,
context, etc. As with the classic rules vs. standards dispute, each jurisprudential moment collapses
into and produces the other-and both are related to each other in the manner of an arrested dialec-
tic. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 426-29 (1985).
39. "When unreflective discourse prevails, such as common sense, it is as if the lens has be-
come the world, rather than the portal through which it takes shape." Roger Sherwin, Dialects and
Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 795
(1988).
Because ... assumptions and beliefs are internalized as the very grounds of consciousness,
they are largely imperceptible to the conscious subject. These conceptualizations are trans-
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presents the world prevents it from recognizing its own formalism. Norma-
tive formalism, like other formalisms, is its own best self-defense. It is its
own best self-defense in the sense that whenever normative legal thought is
intellectually challenged, it unconsciously re-establishes in the very form of
the intellectual struggle, its own fundamental understanding of the agenda,
the issues, the legitimate forms of argumentation, the criteria of failure and
success, and so on.40 Self-defense, of course, is what disciplinary solipsism is
all about.4
1
Admittedly, as solipsistic enterprises go, normative legal thought is
pretty nice--or at least, it looks pretty nice. For instance, it's really nice to
think that we are all self-directing, coherent, integrated, rational, originary
selves who are engaged in a rational conversation in which we aim to resolve
disagreement by resort to normative dialogue. It's really nice to think that
our political disagreements turn upon our own self-conscious commitments
to different "values." It's nice to think that law and politics can be sub-
servient to a grand conversation about who we think we should become.
It is all very nice. It is also absolutely unbelievable. What is more, the
unbelievable character of normative legal thought is becoming increasingly
parent in the sense that they act as a cognitive filter through which the subject sees the
social world. As long as the subject remains unreflective, this transparency will project the
mutual entailment of the epistemic and the political in a way that will be experienced as
"objective."
Winter, supra note 3, at -
40. This point echoes Alasdair MacIntyre's claims about the character of liberalism:
Liberalism... does of course appear in contemporary debates in a number of guises and in
so doing is often successful in preempting the debate by reformulating quarrels and con-
flicts with liberalism, so that they appear to have become debates within liberalism, putting
in question this or that particular set of attitudes or policies, but not the fundamental tenets
of liberalism with respect to individuals and the expression of their preferences....
It is then unsurprising that in contemporary debates about justice and practical ration-
ality one initial problem for those antagonistic to liberalism is that of either discovering or
constructing some institutional forum or arena within which the terms of the debate have
not already predetermined its outcome.
ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, WHOSE JusTIcE? WIcH RATIONALFTY? 392-93 (1988).
And as Derrida cautions, "Mhe simple practice of language ceaselessly reinstates the new ter-
rain on the oldest ground." JACQUFS DERRIDA, The End of Man, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (A.
Bass trans. 1982).
41. This is why if one seeks to disrupt a disciplinary formalism-normative or otherwise-one
cannot simply argue "politely" against it. "Polite" argument is precluded because the very protocol
of disciplinary engagement is always already rigged. It has to to be: It wouldn't be a discipline if its
very form were not already structured so as to preserve the discipline and to derail subversive lines of
inquiry. What distinguishes disciplines from mere points of view, sets of ideas, or assortments of
theories is that disciplines are linguistically, cognitively, and institutionally entrenched. Disciplines
achieve security from challenge by constituting the very self of the disciplinary thinker as a series of
rhetorical, cognitive, psychological defenses against troublesome or subversive lines of inquiry. To
master or even participate in a discipline is not just to learn an assortment of ideas, techniques,
authorities, etc. It is to become a certain kind of thinker, and hence, a certain kind of person.
When a discipline is then challenged (as it is here) disciplinary thinkers are very likely to experi-
ence this challenge as an attack on the self-their selves. It is thus not surprising that when discipli-
nary thinkers are confronted with challenges to their discipline, they react personally and
dismissively. They experience challenges as "a way of fighting over whether our lives have been
wasted." Calvin Trillin, A Reporter at Large. Harvard Law, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 1984, at 53, 83
(quoting a Harvard Law School professor).
This is perfectly understandable. It is also unfortunate.
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evident. And as legal thinkers become increasingly aware of the fantastic
character of normative legal thought, the enchantment of normative legal
thought weakens and withers. Here, I'm just trying to help this disenchant-
ment process along.
Of course, it's not as if this disenchantment process requires a great deal
of help. On the contrary, we are just this far [... ] away from recognizing
that contemporary normative legal thought is a particularly shallow lan-
guage game: "language game" in the Wittgensteinian as well as in the ludic
sense,42 and "shallow" in the sense of... well, shallow. The normative
jurisprudential world, built of arguments upon arguments upon argu-
ments-just hanging there on the threads of normative structures marked
out with concepts like fairness, consent, oppression, neutrality, and policed
by aesthetic criteria like coherence, consistency, certainty, elegance-is
about to crash. More accurately, it has already crashed,43 and it is just a
matter of time before the entire legal academy takes notice. Now, of course,
it may take considerable time for the academy to notice.4 Indeed, it is one
of the vexations of our condition in the legal academy, as elsewhere, that
various kinds of thought remain socially and institutionally operative (in fact
dominant) long after their intellectual vitality has dissipated. And so it is
with normative legal thought. It remains socially and institutionally opera-
tive within the legal academy, though it is a jurisprudential world that has
already crashed. The significant question is when and how the legal acad-
emy will take notice.
In an attempt to help this process of recognition along, what follows is a
42. I am borrowing the term "ludic" from Arthur Leff. See Arthur Leff, Law And, 87 YALE
LJ. 989, 999 (1978).
43. For arguments and demonstrations that legal thought is in the midst of an epistemic crisis,
see Duncan Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205, 217
(1979) ("The history of legal thought in our culture is the history of the emergence of... [the] legal
version of the liberal mode, its progressive abstraction and generalization through the 19th century
until it structured all legal problems, and its final disintegration in the early 20th century."); Schlag,
Cannibal Moves, supra note 18 (tracing the gyrations of the crash through the unstable and paradoxi-
cal character of contemporary legal thought); Winter, supra note 26, at 669-81 (arguing that the
legal academy is experiencing an epistemic crisis presaging a Kuhnian paradigm shift).
Perhaps this footnote means that at least part of the zeitgeist is going my way. Maybe. It's
more likely the other way around.
44. Even though the legal academic community is, as a matter of self-image, steeped in liberal
humanism, much of its organization and intellectual reproduction is arranged along more feudal
lines. Feudalism, of course, is not known for its social speed.
Feudalism tends to reproduce itself in its own static image. This is true in the legal academy as
well. And it helps explain why legal thought tends to be (at least) one generation out of time. It
helps explain, for example, why some young legal scholars are even now, still legitimating the War-
ren Court after all these years-or attempting to transpose its same old jurisprudence to other insti-
tutions such as the legislature or state constitutions. Ironically, even these observations are
themselves dj& vu:
Some institutions... have found words and rules serving them as midwife or even as
ancestor;, but in the main it is action which comes first, to be followed by delayed percep-
tion of that action, then by rationalization of the action delayed still longer, and finally by
conscious normatization of what has been perceived or rationalized. Before these latter
processes have been worked out, the lines of the action commonly have shifted. Veblen's
eyes were keen: "A man's ethics are modelled on the conditions of his grandfather's time."
Karl Llewelyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17 n.30 (1934).
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capsule description of the degeneration/development of normative legal
thought. This degeneration/development proceeds in, and can be under-
stood as, an increasing awareness by normative legal thought of its own role
and character. As this degeneration/development unfolds, the meanings,
the identities, and the grammatical relations of recurring terms such as
"thinker," "thought," and "normative" change as well.
To begin with, consider a crude but illustrative example: If I call some-
thing "justice," this means that this something (whatever it is) is a good
thing and that you too will want to be in favor of that thing. It also means
that, if you do not want to be in favor of that something, then you will want
to find some principled reason why the something I have called "justice" is
not justice. This game can be played with other terms like "oppression,"
"choice," "consent," etc. What is truly wonderful about normative legal
thought, then, is that it immediately compels people to take certain roughly
predictable steps in the dialogic game: "You're evil." "No I'm not." And
so on (except with more argumentative flourish).
Admittedly, normative legal thought is more complex than these exam-
ples would suggest, but nevertheless, its rhetorical situation and the point
remain the same: What is becoming increasingly evident to many legal
thinkers is that "justice" and "oppression" and "coercion" and "consent,"
etc., and the grammar accompanying this vocabulary are all part of a norma-
tive language game. It is important not to make too much of this recogni-
tion. Just because some legal enterprise becomes identified as a language
game does not necessarily mean that the participants in the game will stop or
lose interest in playing that language game.4 5 The term "language game,"
after all, is not pejorative... 46
Still, something interesting occurs with the recognition that normative
legal thought is a kind of language game. Legal thinkers become aware that
normative legal thought is largely a performative enterprise 4 7 -one that uses
45.
The upshot of Wittgenstein's view of language is that all of our language has meaning
only within the language games and "forms of life" in which they are embedded. One must
understand the use, the context, the activity, the purpose, the game which is being
played.... There are many important lessons here for law, but skepticism is not one of
them.
Brian Langille, Revolution Without Foundation: The Grammar Scepticism and Law, 33 McGILL
L.. 451, 495-96 (1988).
46. .. . except, of course within certain select language games that make the expression pejora-
tive. For instance, in the language games of the legal academy, the argument that some or most of
legal academic production must be understood in social terms-that is, as a kind of language game-
is routinely understood as some sort of impermissible and illegitimate insult.
47. I am using the Austinian distinction between the performative and the constative. Austin
tried to establish a heuristic dichotomy between constative andperformative utterances. A constative
utterance describes a state of affairs and is either true or false. An example might be "The sun is out
today." A performative utterance, by contrast, has operative significance, performs as an action, and
is neither true nor false. An example might be the declaration "I do" at a marriage ceremony. One
of the interesting contributions of Austin's work is his rejection of the possibility of classifying utter-
ances as either entirely constative or entirely performative. Utterances are mixed cases of the
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normative words and normative grammars instrumentally to induce specific
kinds of social action. While this recognition may be obnoxious for some
unreconstructed normative thinkers who insist upon maintaining the pure,
transcendent character of normative thought, most legal thinkers will read-
ily accept and accommodate themselves to this recognition. Indeed, the no-
tion that normative legal thought is instrumentally effective not because of
any so-called "intrinsic" normative authenticity, but rather because of its
rhetorical facility for manipulating the self-image, and thus the self, of the
reader is something that most normative legal thinkers can readily accept.
Few care how normative legal thought does its work, so long as it does work.
Of course, once it is widely recognized that normative legal thought is a
technique of rhetorical manipulation, the recognition itself begins to produce
certain performative effects. Once legal thinkers understand that the signifi-
cance of the normative categories and the normative grammar is largely
performative, they assume a new stance towards normative rhetoric. They
see it as an instrumental vehicle for achieving their favorite political or
moral ends.43 Consequently, normative rhetoric becomes subject to rather
intense pressure. For example, consider the normative word "freedom."
This particular word has a certain exchange value in our rhetoric and in our
discourse. It is well known, for instance, that at present, "freedom" of [... ]
enjoys a certain rhetorical advantage over "security" of [... ]. That is to
say, at present, "freedom" is rhetorically superior to "security." 49 As legal
thinkers come to recognize this point, they try, of course, to associate "free-
dom" with their favorite values, leaving "security" as the word for compet-
ing or interfering values. Thus the exchange value of the "freedom" word
rises in the rhetorical economy of legal thought. However, the rise in the
exchange value of such normative words typically yields an inflationary spi-
ral. Sooner or later everybody is using the "freedom" word. For a while,
the political charm of the "freedom" word can survive accelerated circula-
tion. The word remains important. It remains important because it remains
performatively effective. It is perceived as a tool, a rhetorical lever. But
precisely because the "freedom" word remains performatively effective, it is
immediately pressed further into all sorts of instrumentalist enterprises,
thereby further diffusing its constative significance. After a while, the "free-
performative and the constative, varying with and depending upon the context. Hence, this is a
distinction that has already collapsed. The collapse of the distinction is not a problem here. On the
contrary, the collapse of the distinction helps make my point.
For further elaboration see JOHN LANGSHAW AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS
(1975). My discussion of the performative character of contemporary normative legal thought and
its increasing loss of performative significance also tracks with Lyotard's discussion of modem and
postmodern science. See generally J.F. LYOTARD, supra note 18.
48. This is precisely the point at which traditional legal thinkers voice the fear that judges and
other legal actors will impose their own "personal values." At this stage in the degeneration/devel-
opment of normative legal, thought, we are still operating within the fantasy that individual legal
thinkers are somehow autonomously in control of their own thoughts and moral values.
49. For an interesting discussion of the relations between the rhetoric and the moral value of
our legal terms, see Peter Westen, "'Freedom" and "Coercion'--Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985
DUKE L.J. 541, 592.
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doam" word doesn't mean much of anything. It isn't even a reliable rhetori-
cal tool to get people to act, or to be or to say various things. On the
contrary, everybody knows the trick: Freedom's just another word for get-
ting you to do something you don't want to do.
Now this linguistic metamorphosis is hardly limited to the "freedom"
word. Rather, the linguistic devaluation affects the entire normative cur-
rency.50 In fact, it affects the entire grammar of normative legal thought.
Hence, entire structures, entire complexes of normative legal thought be-
come increasingly vacuous-their purchase on the world, descriptive and
regulatory, less and less credible. Even the performative value of these struc-
tures and complexes becomes weakened as legal thinkers come to recognize
that their constative significance has been devalued.51
As the normative currency is devalued, the relation between normative
structures and complexes, on the one hand, and the practices to which they
ostensibly correspond, on the other, becomes weakened, attenuated. No
longer is it possible to maintain a naive idealism or materialism where nor-
mative conceptions such as "justice," "liberty," ".consent," or "community,"
either determine or are determined by the practices to which they ostensibly
correspond. The language of determination, and even its softer, more
nuanced dialects, no longer provide an adequate understanding of the situa-
tion of normative legal thought. Here, the point is not that normative legal
thought has now become indeterminate, as opposed to some previous or pos-
sible state of determinacy. Rather, the point is that determination is no
longer the appropriate frame of reference for charting the relation between
normative legal thought and the practices it ostensibly addresses.
It is at this point that the legal thinker recognizes that the value (if any)
of normative legal thought does not depend so much on its relation to the
practices it seeks to describe or govern. It now becomes evident that the
value (if any) of normative legal thought depends on a decentered economy
of bureaucratic institutions and practices-such as those constituting and
traversing the law school, the organized bar, the courts-that define and re-
present their own operations, their own character, their own performances,
in the normative currency. Indeed, at this point, normative legal thought
takes on a completely different character. It becomes the mode of discourse
by which bureaucratic institutions and practices re-present themselves as
subject to the rational ethical-moral control of autonomous individuals
(when indeed they are not), just as normative legal thought constructs us
(you and me) to think and act as if we were at the center-in charge, so to
speak-of our own normative legal thought (when indeed we are not). Nor-
50. This devaluation is reflected in the accelerating velocity with which virtue and vice words
are replaced in legal thought.
51. Now this recognition does not mean that normative legal thought is immediately rendered
powerless. On the contrary, there is an entire academic authority structure (largely feudal in charac-
ter) that organizes itself and its own academic reproduction in terms of the categories and grammar
of normative legal discourse. It cannot be expected that this authority structure will automatically
fold even if it recognizes that its claims to intellectual legitimacy are vacuous.
November 1990]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
mative legal thought can no longer be seen to govern, regulate or even de-
scribe human activity.
In fact, as a further step in this degeneration/development, it now ap-
pears that it is very difficult to discern any significant difference between
normative legal thought and the operation, performance, reproduction, and
proliferation of bureaucratic practices and institutions. The two collapse
into each other. At this point, normative legal thought has become the oper-
ation, performance, reproduction, and proliferation of bureaucratic practices
and institutions.
Normative legal thought is effective-very effective-but not in any way
it imagines itself to be. Its significance can no longer lie in its specific pre-
scriptions or conclusions (which are rarely adopted or even capable of being
adopted). Normative legal thought-this form of thought so concerned with
producing normatively desirable worldly effects-has, ironically, become its
own self-referential end. 52 And that end is coextensive with the operation,
performance, reproduction, and proliferation of bureaucratic practices and
institutions.
Welcome to the crash. My sense is that when legal thinkers re-cognize
that normative legal thought is an economy of self-referential instrumentalist
rhetorical structures run from elsewhere and gradually seeping themselves of
meaning, both constative and performative, playing this language game of
normative legal thought will lose a great deal of its moral and intellectual
cachet. It is one thing to understand one's self as engaged in a normative
enterprise aimed at improving the moral or political or economic perform-
ance of the legal profession or the courts through normative argument. It is
quite another to understand one's self as a bureaucratic vehicle for the
proliferation of a mode of discourse (normative legal thought) that is coex-
tensive with bureaucratic practice and institutional inertia. As self-images
go, my sense is that the latter is not really great. It is likely to lead to a
certain degree of disenchantment. And my sense is that the disenchantment
of normative legal thought is already well on its way.5
3
Now, one reaction a normative legal thinker might have to all this is that
it is all perfectly horrible-and that we should all try to preserve our norma-
tive universe by using words more carefully and by arguing very morally
against instrumentalism and the instrumentalization of law (and so on). But
52. This point of extreme reflexivity is suggested in analogous contexts by Jean Baudrillard
when he writes:
And what if all advertising were the apology not of a product, but of advertising itself?
What if information did not refer back to an event, but to the promotion of information
itself as event? What if communication no longer referred back to a message, but to the
promotion of communication itself as myth?
JEAN BAUDRILLARD, LA TRANSPARENCE DU MAL: ESSAI SUR LES PHENOMENES EXTREMES 56
(1990) (author's translation).
53. "We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions.
But we have-very largely, if not entirely-lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical,
of morality." "What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts
which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived." ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFrER VIRTUE 2 (2d ed. 1984).
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this argument misses the point again. This is history-not dialogue among
disembodied Cartesian selves. And it doesn't do much good to make norma-
tive arguments against history---especially not if you keep misidentifying
your own addressee, your agent of change, your subject. Unfortunately, that
is precisely what normative legal thought keeps getting confused about. It
keeps thinking that it is addressing some morally competent, well-inten-
tioned individual who has his hands on the levers of power.- The pervasive-
ness of this metaphysical confusion-its routine character within the legal
academy-is precisely what engenders the more socially situated confusions
of "liberal" and "progressive" legal academics as to whether or not the War-
ren Court is still sitting.55
All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is
also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this normative legal
thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a field of pain and
death.56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place,
normative legal thought is playing language games-utterly oblivious to the
character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in
considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to
the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often
genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death. However, the
problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal
thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal think-
ers. What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning,
let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine
of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of pain and
death.
And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands
its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be
outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing
that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated
from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is
what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous,
self-image-its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and
effectiveness.
All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal
54. This is a quaint and endearing image of law. It is so entrancing that it could easily mystify.
As a gentle reminder, consider a multiple choice question: The image of the morally competent,
well-intentioned person with his hands on the levers of power is an accurate description of:
a) every judge
b) every other judge
c) every other legal academic's view of every judge
d) the Wizard of Oz
e) answers (c) and (d).
55. Still no definitive word on this one.
56. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L... 1601 (1986).
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thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and
as having effects within that field.57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be
maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has
effects on the field of pain and death-at least not in the direct, originary
way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that normative legal thought is
the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institu-
tional allocation of the pain and the death.58 And apart from the leftover
ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine),
there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in
control of normative legal thought.
The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative appeal of
normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that
normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presenta-
tion of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that
normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of pres-
ent political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically rein-
scribes its own aesthetic-its own fantastic understanding of the political
and moral scene.
59
Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical
postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible
enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal
academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves em-
powered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions
of bureaucratic practices-academic and otherwise.
6°
To the extent possible, it is important to avoid this kind of category mis-
take. For instance, it is important to understand that your automobile insur-
ance adjuster is not simply some updated version of the eighteenth century
57. Yet note, ironically, that this depiction of the situation of legal thought is used recurrently
by Stanley Fish-in his characteristically uncongratulatory way-to demonstrate the futility and
inadequacy of legal theories. See Schlag, Fish v. Zapp, supra note 26, at 55-56; Winter, supra note
26, at 661-62 (container metaphor).
58. This conceptualization of normative legal thought and violence is suggested in Rosemary
Coombe's comments on Cover's essay:
Cover made a crucial and too-often evaded point when he claimed the priority of the
fact that legal interpretation is essentially related to the legitimated practice of political
violence.... But... [h]is discussion proceeds under the assumption that legal interpreta-
tion takes place in a context of violence, because it signals or occasions the potential for
violence, and violence (be it capital punishment, imprisonment, being deprived of one's
children or property) is the likely result or consequence of such interpretation.
What Cover might have argued, and what most critical modera social theory implies,
is that legal interpretation is not something joined with the practice of violent domination,
but an example of that practice.
Rosemary Coombe, "Same as It Ever Was" Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation, 34 Mc-
GILL L.J. 601, 649 (1989).
59. And it is important not to assume that simply because we recognize that normative legal
thought is in a degenerative state, this recognition allows us to get beyond it. On the contrary: "We
should fall victim to a disastrous self-deception if we were to take the view that a haughty contempt
is all that is needed to let us escape from the imperceptible power of the uniformly one-sided view."
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, WHAT IS CALLED THINKING? 34 (F. Wieck & S. Gray trans. 1968).
60. (Not me, of course.) See notes 18 & 59 supra.
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individual humanist subject. Even though the insurance adjuster will quite
often engage you in normative talk-arguing with you about responsibility,
fairness, fault, allocation of blame, adequacy of compensation, and the like-
he is unlikely to be terribly receptive or susceptible to any authentic norma-
tive dialogue. His normative competence, his normative sensitivity, is
scripted somewhere else. It is important to be clear about these things. The
contemporary lawyer, for instance, may talk the normative rhetoric of the
eighteenth century individual humanist subject. But make no mistake: This
normative or humanist rhetoric is very likely the unfolding of bureaucratic
logic. The modem lawyer is very often a kind of meta-insurance adjuster.
And that makes you and me, as legal academics, trainers of meta-insurance
adjusters.
This is perhaps an unpleasant realization. One of the most important
effects of normative legal thought is to intercede here so that we, as legal
academics, do not have to confront this unpleasant realization. Normative
legal thought allows us to pretend that we are preparing our students to
become Atticus Finch61 while we are in fact training people who will enter
the meta-insurance adjustment business.
For our students, this role-confusion is unlikely to be very funny. It will
get even less so upon their graduation-when they learn that Atticus Finch
has been written out of the script. For us, of course, it is a pleasant fantasy
to think we are teaching Atticus Finch. When the fantasy is over, it becomes
one hell of a category mistake. And in the rude transition from the one to
the other, Atticus Finch can quickly turn into Dan Quayle. In fact, if you
train your students to become Atticus Finch, they will likely end up as Dan
Quayle-cognitively defenseless against the regimenting and monitoring
practices of bureaucratic institutions. Atticus Finch, as admirable as he may
be, has none of the cognitive or critical resources necessary to understand
the duplicities of the bureaucratic networks within which we operate. Apart
from the fantasies of the legal academy, there is no longer a place in America
for a lawyer like Atticus Finch. There is nothing for him to do here-noth-
ing he can do. He is a moral character in a world where the role of moral
thought has become at best highly ambivalent, a normative thinker in a
world where normative legal thought is already largely the bureaucratic
logic of institutions.
But don't worry-be normative. My bet is that when normative legal
thought takes note of the crash, it will argue against it ... on normative
grounds, of course.62 The argument will be structured in terms of the deter-
mination of the epistemic by the normative.63 Or in simpler terms: "There
is no crash... because to acknowledge a crash (in law) would bring about
61. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
62. And Stanley Fish haunts me here, because I don't want him to be right, but still, here he is,
saying, "But of course, they'll argue on normative grounds. What else could they do?" See generally
S. FISH, supra note 26, at 372-98.
63. Actually, the argument has already been made-in fact several times. It's part of the rou-
tine. We can even pretend the citations are here. They are.
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terrible social consequences, a loss of meaning, etc.... Therefore, there
can't be any crash. Therefore, there isn't any crash." Another winning
argument.
This argument will likely be accompanied by great and moving efforts to
revive normative legal thought through the teaching of ethics and moral-
ity.64 What else? Actually, one other thing. Normative legal thought, this
local offshoot of liberal humanism, can be expected to do its usual conserva-
tive collapse move, and to mourn, in a nostalgic sort of way, the passing of
the normative world. "In the old days, when people were moral.... "
Now, other than these sorts of responses, I think it would be unrealistic
to expect anything else of normative legal thought at present. Normative
legal thought simply does not possess the sort of cognitive or critical re-
sources to recuperate from the crash. From the perspective of normative
legal thought, either the crash does not exist, or if it does, it is simply an
unaccountable, inexplicable intellectual and cultural catastrophe. Indeed, in
static terms, the existing categories, the existing grammar of normative legal
thought, are utterly incapable of providing any sort of sophisticated account
for the crash. Viewed dynamically, normative legal thought could conceiva-
bly begin to apprehend the crash and respond. But, of course, that's not
where the energies of normative legal thought are dedicated. On the con-
trary. Normative legal thought, like liberal humanism more generally, is
spending (virtually) all of its intellectual and psychic resources fueling a de-
nial of the crash.
Liberal humanism and normative legal thought are both very good at
denial. 65 They ought to be. They are the routine. They are in place. They
are institutionally and cognitively embedded.
By way of example, consider the scholarly exchanges among normative
legal thinkers. They all differ about all sorts of things. They differ about
"important" issues such as what should be the appropriate mix of commu-
nity, liberty, freedom, equality, empowerment, efficiency, etc. And while
normative legal thinkers differ about these "important" normative issues,
there is one thing that they all agree upon, over and over again... without
even having to think about it. What they all agree upon, in this implicit
unexamined sort of way, is that they are all autonomous, rational, morally
competent individuals who are having a meaningful, important, and effective
discussion about how society or some subdivision thereof should be
organized.
This pleasant fantasy is harmless enough, except that it reproduces legal
academics and law students (and hence lawyers) in the image of humanist
individual subjects. This, too, is a harmless self-indulgence, except that it
provides instrumentalist bureaucracies with an absolutely marvelous and
64. As Baudrillard puts it: "The effects of moral conscience, of collective conscience are en-
tirely mediated effects, and one can read in the therapeutic ardor with which we try to rescuscitate
this conscience, how little life it retains." J. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 52, at 97 (author's
translation).
65. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1988).
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captivating rhetoric that defines, organizes, routinizes, and services their cli-
entele. It's all really neat. 7-11 sells freedom (which you can find in their
Slurpees). Pepsi brings you the downfall of the Berlin Wall. And normative
legal thought guides the development of the law.

